‘I guarded Britain’s nuclear sites

Sometimes he would patrol rural lanes on foot, carrying his assault rifle, looking out for any terrorists hiding in the countryside. On other assignments he would man machine guns mounted on armoured ships, watching for any sign of hostile vessels coming his way. Or he would drive in weapons-laden road convoys, monitoring potential threats from vehicles.

While serving as an armed officer with the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC), Matt Okuhara saw every aspect of how the UK’s nuclear power stations and their radioactive fuel are protected from terrorists.

He spent years escorting the transport of uranium fuel to and from plants, which would be planned for months in advance. “Nuclear material is at its most vulnerable when it’s in transit,” he explains. “You’ve got to move it as secretly as possible.”

Working for the specialist force, Okuhara always felt confident the country’s civil nuclear programme was in safe hands. “Any threat has been detected long before it’s been able to cause any problems,” he says.

However, he believes the situation is “definitely more dangerous now” than when he was serving. Terrorism has become more advanced and there are new fears about so-called hybrid warfare from geopolitical adversaries including Russia.

“You don’t have to be a James Bond super-villain to realise where the vulnerable parts of a site are. You can just look on Google Maps and say, ‘We’ll attack that bit,’ especially now we’ve got drones. The threat has really shot up.”

With new technology also on the horizon, he believes the nuclear industry must face up to big security questions.

The CNC currently guards just a handful of sites, all in relatively remote locations. But experts believe the Government’s planned array of cutting-edge mini nuclear power stations could lead to a “proliferation” of reactors around the country, potentially much closer to towns and cities. This may also lead to their fuel being transported more often.

Small modular reactors (SMRs) are seen as an essential source of green energy for the UK in decades to come. Proponents say they will be quicker and cheaper to build than conventional plants, because they will be largely prefabricated.

But security experts are worried about the complex implications for how SMRs will be policed and protected, as The i Paper revealed this week. Analysts say that thousands more armed officers would have to be recruited, co-ordination with local police would have to be strengthened, and a new national infrastructure force may even have to be created.

Okuhara shares these concerns. “I don’t think the CNC’s current policing model would be able to cope with any more sites,” he says. “The generating sites, they’re kept well away from the public for good reasons.

“One, they’re easier to protect. And two, if something goes wrong, the contingency engineers have got some space to work with.”

What is the Civil Nuclear Constabulary?

• The CNC is a specialist armed force with about 1,600 officers and staff. It was created in 2005 to guard civil nuclear sites and material.
• “The CNC will deter any attacker whose intent is the theft, sabotage or destruction of nuclear material, whether static or in transit, or the sabotage of high consequence facilities,” its web page explains.
• It adds: “If an attack occurs, CNC will defend that material and those facilities and deny access to them. If material is seized or high consequence facilities are compromised, the CNC will recover control of those facilities and regain custody of the material.”

New small reactors, same big risks 

After fighting in the Iraq War with British infantry, Okuhara joined the CNC in 2006 and served for six years. He describes how he helped to protect Gloucestershire’s Oldbury Power Station – which is now undergoing decommissioning – in his new book, Nuclear Copper. “Based within the high metal fences and fortress-like security measures of the power station, there was a heavily armed police presence on duty at any given time,” he writes.

To deter and prevent terrorism, the team patrolled surrounding roads and villages, wearing body armour and carrying G36C assault rifles. They benefited from the rural location by building relationships with local farmers and villagers, who “could recognise an unfamiliar car or person instantly” and knew to inform officers.

Rules currently state that nuclear power stations can only be placed in “semi-urban” settings. A spokesperson for the Department for Energy Security & Net Zero insists: “All new nuclear projects, including SMRs, are prevented from being built in densely populated areas.” The Government is loosening restrictions on them being built in the countryside.

But a majority of industry figures believe that “new nuclear technologies could be safely located closer to densely populated areas,” according to an official consultation paper.

The Whitehall document says that the semi-urban restriction will be reviewed every five years “to ensure it remains relevant and effective,” and the Government is “open to revising” this rule in future.

Okuhara now lives in Japan, a country which knows the risks of nuclear technology better than any other – following 2011’s Fukushima disaster in 2011, when a tsunami knocked out cooling systems, leading to meltdown.

He still backs nuclear power generation, but thinks the UK should stick to building bigger conventional plants in the countryside, like Hinkley Point in Somerset and Sizewell in Suffolk. “You’re doing the discount version… I don’t think that’s a good idea.”

“Keir Starmer is saying we’re going to get past this ‘nimbyism,’ but I don’t want nuclear fuel in my back garden,” he adds.

The nuclear industry argues that SMRs will be small enough to build in urban settings, but Okuhara argues this would rob officers of a key advantage. “An intervention zone around a site gives you plenty of space where you can detect things,” he explains.

And he underlines that mini reactors do not pose miniature hazards. “On security, size doesn’t matter. When it comes to the fuel and the byproducts, they are equally dangerous.”

At the moment, energy companies cover much of the CNC’s costs. But having many smaller sites is likely to make security operations proportionately more expensive.

“You get less energy, but you’re still going to have exactly the same security concerns,” says Okuhara. “How enthusiastic is a site operator going to be paying for security when that’s eating into their bottom line?”

He continues: “If you think about the largest sites in the UK, places like Sellafield or Dounreay, they’ve got hundreds of officers. There are plenty of people out on patrol. Are these SMRs going to be given sufficient resources? Or are the companies going to be saying: ‘It’s a small reactor, we don’t need as many bodies on the ground’?”

The Government offers reassurance that any SMR will “need to have the highest levels of security in place.” A spokesperson said: “All operators are answerable to a robust and independent regulator – the Office for Nuclear Regulation – which must approve their security plan covering physical, personnel and cyber security.” The CNC declined to comment.

Vetting failures 

If potentially thousands more armed officers must be recruited to guard SMRs, the CNC must improve its vetting procedures. That much is clear because of one man: Wayne Couzens.

Couzens’ name became infamous after he raped and murdered Sarah Everard in Surrey in 2021, having used his Metropolitan Police ID to falsely arrest her.

Couzens had previously been an authorised firearms officer with the CNC, serving at Sellafield and Dungeness. He had passed the CNC’s vetting procedures in 2011 despite previously being accused of numerous sexual offences, including harassment, assault and indecent exposure. He transferred to the Met in 2018.

The CNC’s Chief Constable, Simon Chesterman, apologised “unreservedly” on behalf of the force in 2024, “for the part CNC played in his entry as a full-time police officer.”

“I will always deeply regret that Couzens served in our force. He was not fit to wear the uniform,” said Chesterman. He recognised that “the police service as a whole has much work to do to strengthen police recruitment and vetting procedures.”

The case shocked Okuhara – especially because he recognised Couzens. “I did his refresher training for self-defence a couple of times,” he reveals.

Not only this, but he knew three of the six former CNC officers who faced a misconduct hearing last year for sharing hundreds of “appalling” racist, misogynistic and ableist messages on Whatsapp. An independent investigation ruled in October that they would have been dismissed if they had not already resigned.

“I trained them when I was an instructor,” says Okuhara. He was surprised and angered, having had no idea about their private views. “They seemed all right at the time.” Back then, he could only assume the officers he worked alongside had gone through thorough background checks when they were recruited. He was appalled to learn of the failings.

He believes the system was not “robust” enough because the CNC previously outsourced its vetting to Thames Valley Police. “They didn’t have too much of a stake in the CNC – it’s probably why these people slipped through the net.” He’s pleased that duty has now been brought back within the force.

No matter whether they’re protecting groundbreaking SMRs, or conventional nuclear sites, or convoys of radioactive fuel, “every officer in the CNC should have the top level of vetting,” he says. “They’ve got access to firearms. They can access some of the most toxic material that has ever existed.”

It’s a reminder that when it comes to nuclear security, sometimes the biggest threats can come from insiders.

‘Nuclear Copper: The Secret World of Nuclear Policing’ by Matt Okuhara is out now (£22.99, Amberley Publishing)

@robhastings.bsky.social